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This paper examines the economics of large scale institutional change by studying the adoption of
the land demarcation practices within the British Empire during the 17th through 19th Centuries.  
The advantages of systematic, coordinated demarcation, such as with the rectangular survey, relative
to individualized, haphazard demarcation, such as with metes and bounds, for reducing transaction
costs were understood by this time and incorporated into British colonial policy.  Still, there was considerable
variation in the institutions adopted even though that the regions had similar legal structures and immigrant
populations. We study the determinants of institutional change by developing an analytical framework,
deriving testable implications, and then analyzing a data set that includes U.S., Canadian, Australian,
and New Zealand temperate colonies using GIS data. We find that a simple framework that outlines
the costs and benefits of implementing the demarcation systems can explain the different institutions
that are observed. Once in place, these institutions persist, indicating a strong institutional path dependence
that can influence transaction costs, the extent of land markets, and the nature of resource use. The
agricultural land institutions that we examine remain in force today, in some cases over 300 years
later.  In this regard, institutions of land are durable, much as are other institutions, such as language
and law.
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[I]n the absence of transaction costs, it does not matter what the law is, since people can 
always negotiate without cost to acquire, subdivide, and combine rights whenever this 
would increase the value of production. In such a world the institutions which make up the 
economic system have neither substance nor purpose. 
20
th Century British Economist Ronald Harry Coase
1 
 
I will only repeat the expression of my confident trust that you have sacrificed everything 
else to the one essential thing--the survey, the survey, the survey.   
19




I.   INTRODUCTION 
Institutions can change in dramatic fashion.  For example, after conquest the victor 
can institute its language, law, currency, economic organizations, and form of government 
on the vanquished. In so doing it expands its institutional reach.
3 Among these new 
institutions are those that govern land, perhaps the most fundamental of resources. A 
conquering regime can decide how property rights to land will be demarcated and assigned.   
Once implemented, absent another dramatic change, these institutions can persist. 
In this paper, we examine the adoption of land demarcation systems within the 
British Empire in the 17
th through 19
th centuries. We focus on temperate colonies settled by 
British emigrants in North America, Australia, and New Zealand.
4 The role of colonial 
emigration, as well as optimal land distribution and demarcation in the colonies were 
debated by leading political economists, including Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John 
Stuart Mill, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, Edward Wakefield, and Robert Torrens 
(Winch 1965). The British Colonial Office (Labaree 1967, Vol. 2) and especially 
                                                 
1 Coase (1989, p.14).  
2 See Wakefield, et al, (1868, p. 290) 
3 History is replete with such conquests and expansions – from Ancient Rome two millennia ago, to the 
British Empire between the 17
th and 20
th centuries, to the Soviet regime of the 20
th century.  
4In this regard, we follow Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Crosby (1986) who also focus on the 
"Neo-Europes" where settlers tried to replicate European institutions. Primary examples of this include 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. 
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Wakefield (1834) called for synchronized, planned settlement and land demarcation. As we 
show, however, there was considerable variation in the institutions actually adopted and we 
analyze the causes of that variation.  
   In his pioneering work Coase (1937, 1960, 1989) was first to develop (or imply) a 
theory of institutional choice when posting that judges choose the most efficient legal 
regimes.  This work led to discussions of the evolution of legal rules and indeed to the law 
and economics movement, and later to work on institutions by North (1990), North, Wallis, 
and Weingast (2009), Acemoglu, Simon, and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005), and others.  
Moreover, as the quoted remark above notes Coase (1989) clearly understood that markets 
themselves are institutions that facilitate trade and indeed “require the establishment of 
legal rules” for them to function.
5     
Ironically, many of Coase’s most famous examples have to do with land.  In “The 
Problem of Social Cost” Coase used the example of land use conflicts between wheat 
farmers and cattle ranchers and his examination of English law focused on nuisance (i.e., 
land use) disputes. In his theory he discussed the importance of the “delimitation of rights” 
to land (1960, 8).  Yet, Coase does not examine in detail how rights to land are actually 
demarcated, nor does Coase acknowledge that the demarcation of land in his native 
England is so different from his adopted home in Chicago.  But, as Coase would certainly 
acknowledge, the practicalities of land demarcation are fundamental because they mold 
land markets and shape land use. Coase, of course, was not alone in overlooking land 
demarcation.  There is little legal or economic scholarship on the factors influencing 
                                                 
5 See Coase (1989, 10-14) and Scott (1998, 256, 351) on the role of underlying institutions for markets. 3 
 
demarcation, and even major property law treatises (e.g., Dukeminier and Krier 2002, 
Merrill and Smith 2007) merely describe the dominant American system.
6   
We begin by briefly summarizing land demarcation in the British Empire. In section 
III we develop a framework for examining the decision to adopt particular demarcation 
systems. In section IV we examine the implications of our framework by examining the 
detailed history of land demarcation in the British colonies and by econometrically 
examining the determinants of those institutional choices.  We summarize our study in 
section V. 
II. LAND DEMARCATION IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 
The British Isles comprise 121,673 square miles. At its peak, the British Empire 
covered 14,200,000 square miles, nearly 25 percent of the world’s land area, and the 
colonial area that we examine involved 10,692,968 square miles.
7 The accumulation of 
these vast expanses of land beyond the home islands generated the practical problems of 
how to allocate this land and how it should be demarcated.  These decisions were 
influenced by the institutions that were developing within Britain at the time of expansion 
and the political economy debates that emerged around colonial policies.  
A. The British Isles. 
  By the mid 17
th century, land in Britain was becoming more valuable and this led to 
changes in land institutions from traditional practices that subsequently influenced British 
colonial policy. For example, the enclosures of scattered and common lands helped to 
                                                 
6 Neither of the comprehensive treatises on law and economics by Posner (2002) and Shavell (2007) mentions 
land demarcation. Demarcation, on the other hand, is examined by economic geographers in describing the 
use of mapping and cadaster systems. For example, see Scott (1998) and Kain and Baigent (1992). Libecap 
and Lueck (2009) and Libecap, Lueck and Lopes  (2010) find that there are economically and statistically 
significant gains in land values from enactment of a systematic, rectangular survey in the United States.    
7  By comparison Africa comprises just 20 percent of the earth and Russia, the largest country is about 11 
percent of the Earth.  The total land area of the Earth is 57,308,738 square miles 
http://www.enchantedlearning.com/geography/continents/Land.shtml. See also Ferguson (2004, 15).  4 
 
restructure, reshape, and consolidate plots into more useful forms for sheep raising and 
larger-scale food production. Land that previously had been held and worked in common or 
in strips was reorganized into plots owned in severalty and in some cases merged into 
rectangular forms that were recognized as beneficial for production and trading.
8 Land 
markets, which historically had been local and limited, became more active and broadly 
based (Darby, 1973, 302-53).  To promote trades, Parliament intervened between 1660 and 
1830 with roughly 3,500 Estate Acts to free property rights from traditional constraints of 
inheritance and other communal requirements (Bogart and Richardson 2009, 3; Richardson 
and Bogart 2008, 7-18).  
These changes in land institutions required more accurate measurement and 
boundary definition and standardization of processes. More precise survey was made 
possible with new procedures and equipment, particularly the introduction of Gunter’s 
chain in 1620, which spread throughout England and subsequently, to the English colonies. 
Gunter’s chain helped to generalize use of a standard statute rod of 16 ½ feet for land 
measurement by surveyors. Other new equipment and practices included the Theodolite 
survey, use of telescopes, the solar compass, and triangulation survey emerged over time 
and influenced the costs and benefits of various demarcation systems.
9  
B. The Temperate British Colonies. 
Figure 1 shows the British Empire colonies in North America, Australia, and New 
Zealand. The addition of these colonies opened vast amounts of new temperate land for 
                                                 
8 Turner (1980), Young (1808) on enclosures in a very large literature. The emergence of rectangular fields as 
a result of some enclosures is noted by Yelling (1977, 120, 123, 131, 138).  For additional discussion of the 
geography of enclosure, see Kain, Chapman, and Oliver (2004). Scott (1998) 24-49 discusses the expansion 
of survey and drafting of cadastral maps in the 17
th-19
th centuries. 
9 Richeson (1996, 140-75) discusses the introduction and spread of Gunter’s chain as well as other survey 
innovations.  Linklater (2002, 13-20) describes the impact of Gunter’s chain on measurement and the 
opportunity to firm private property rights to land.  5 
 
British immigrants. Abundant land in these regions offered the possibility of transplanting 
British farms, agricultural practices, crops, and land institutions. The question of how to 
design and manage colonization became part of British political economy debates in the 
18
th and 19th centuries.   
[Figure 1 here]   
One issue was whether land should be allocated in a decentralized, unsystematic 
manner, with individual land claims and demarcation through traditional English metes and 
bounds. "Metes" refers to property boundaries defined by the measurement of distances 
between terminal points, and "bounds" refers to boundary descriptions based on 
topography.  Under metes and bounds demarcation, parcels were surveyed independently 
after settlement and generally resulted in non-uniform, uncoordinated shapes, sizes, and 
alignment.
10  
An alternative was to allocate and demarcate land in a more organized, systematic 
manner, with the survey of land parcels prior to distribution. Coordinated demarcation 
could be within a local area, organized by a particular colonial group or large land owner, 
or it might be broader, covering a larger jurisdiction, organized by a government. The 
rectangular grid was favored.
 11 Colonial towns often were laid out with square blocks 
(Thrower, 1966, 9), and Robert Torrens and Edward Gibbon Wakefield, two important 19
th 
century political economists and politicians, called for the strictly planned distribution of all 
                                                 
10 See Libecap and Lueck (2009) for a discussion; also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metes_and_bounds . 
11 The rectangular grid or rectangular survey (RS) is system of rectangles established to locate and specify 
boundaries for land parcels. In the U.S. Public Lands System Survey, the RS divides land into townships of 6 
miles square, bounded by base lines running east and west, and meridians running north and south.  
Townships are further divided into 36 sections, each one mile square. Sections can be subdivided into quarter 
sections, quarter-quarter sections, and so on:  http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/boundaries/a_plss.html. A 
survey technique that used in the 19
th century was triangulation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triangulation. 
Triangulation involves measurement of the angles of a series of triangles to fix property location and 
boundaries. If done in an organized manner, parcels could be demarcated with respect to one another.  6 
 
colonial agricultural land and controlled settlement to create productive colonies (Winch 
1965, 56-93).
12 One element of Wakefield’s Colonial Reform Movement was the survey of 
land into squares prior to sale an occupation (Winch, 1965, 113-45; Oldham, 1917, 4, 16, 
74; Burroughs, 1967, 12-3). Squares offered potential productivity gains as well as clear 
boundaries and uniform parcels for exchange in land markets.
13 Wakefield argued that 
allowing individualized claiming and demarcation with uncoordinated metes and bounds 
would lead to confusion, a lack of organization, and failure. The interests of individuals to 
independently claim land would diverge from the broader interests of colonial society, 
which would be molded by the way in which land was demarcated (Winch 1965, 137). 
  The potential benefits of more centrally-controlled, planned demarcation were 
incorporated into circulars issued by the British Colonial Office in the late 17
th and 18
th 
centuries:   
First, that you, our said governor….of our lands for the [northern, southern] district 
of North America….taking care that such districts so to be surveyed and laid out as 
aforesaid be divided into such a number of lots (each lot to contain not less than 
one hundred nor more than one thousand acres) as our survey general shall judge 
best adapted to the nature and situation of the districts so to be surveyed….That so 
soon as the said survey shall have been made and returned as aforesaid, you, our 
said governor or commander in chief of our said province….appoint such time and 




                                                 
12 Torrens, originally from Ireland, became Premier of South Australia and later a member of the British 
Parliament.  He is widely known for creating the system of land registrations that goes by his name. 
Wakefield was a leading colonial policy theorist especially for the centralized demarcation of lands in South 
Australia, New Zealand, and later Canada. He was a Director of the New Zealand Company, co founder of the 
Colonial Reform Movement, and a member of the New Zealand Parliament. 
13 Other aspects of the Colonial Reform Movement included constraints on the supply of new lands made 
available at any point in time and high fixed prices. Studies by Barnes (1935) and Lee and Sallee (1974) show 
production advantages in rectangular fields where the farmer works parallel to the longest sides of the field.  
14 Labaree (1967, vol 2, 536).  For similar instructions for various other colonies see Labaree (1967, vol 2, 
537, 540, 541, 586-87). 7 
 
The potential advantages of the broad, uniform rectilinear demarcation of land also 
were recognized in the U.S. at the end of the colonial period during Congressional debates 
over the Land Ordinance of May 20, 1785 that ultimately resulted in the Public Lands 
Survey System.
15 Congress rejected metes and bounds and instead called for survey before 
occupation with properties to be marked in squares, aligned with each other, “so that no 
land would be left vacant,” to prevent overlapping claims, and to simplify registering deeds 
(Linklater, 2002, 68-70; White, 1983, 9).   
 III. A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE  
  In this section we examine the decision to adopt a particular land demarcation 
system.  We first examine the simple stylized choice between a rectangular system (RS) 
and metes and bounds (MB).  This analysis allows general predictions about the choice 
between these two dominant demarcation institutions. We then extend our model to 
consider the choice among these two regimes and a third intermediate regime also used in 
the British Empire.
16    
To begin, it is apparent that there are potential gains from centralized demarcation 
(Libecap and Lueck 2009).  First, there can be enforcement cost savings from coordinating 
common borders, eliminating gaps of unclaimed land, and clarifying boundaries. Second, 
similarly aligned properties will eliminate oddly-shaped, unproductive parcels that arise 
with unsynchronized demarcation of large areas.  Third, a common demarcation pattern 
provides information about the position of individual parcels. This information reduces 
potential for overlapping and conflicting claims; allows for a common address system; and 
importantly, lowers transaction costs, promoting land markets.  Fourth, coordinated 
                                                 
15 Ford (1910, reprinted 1976, 27, 55), Linklater (2002, 116, 117), Pattison (1957, 87). 
16 Our model follows Libecap and Lueck (2009).   8 
 
demarcation is a public good network that will have greater value as it is spread over a 
larger region.   
An organized system with uniform parcels, such as the rectangular grid, provides 
the largest benefits with similarly shaped, sized, and aligned parcels, but it potentially 
entails higher costs than does an organized/non uniform system that has fewer constraints 
on parcel size and shape. An organized/non uniform system, however, provides fewer 
coordination benefits because parcels are no longer necessarily similar in shape and size. 
The third option, an unorganized metes and bounds demarcation system does not provide 
any of the benefits of organized demarcation, but it avoids the costs of controlled entry and 
delayed settlement and production until survey.  
The economic decision to adopt a coordinated rectangular demarcation system 
relative to metes and bounds can be examined by comparing the total value of land under 
both arrangements. This expression is the sum of parcel values, less the costs of the systems 
themselves. Assume the Empire is considering land demarcation for a region (e.g., a 
colony) that is A acres in size.  We incorporate a temporal dimension to account for 
difference in system setup and continuation costs.  
Under metes and bounds (MB) the net value of the land is the sum of individual 
values and costs, less the continuing costs associated with adjustments resulting from the 
lack of coordination, so that the total present value of the land in the region is 
(1) 





( , ) ( , ) ( , )
T
MB MB r V A t c A t C A t e d V
t
t t t
- = - - ∫ ,  
where 
*( , ) V A t t  is the optimal parcel value under MB at time τ, T is the time horizon, t is a 
parameter measuring topography which varies along the interval (0,1) where 0 is flat and 9 
 
most valuable and 1 is vertical and least valuable, r is a discount rate, c0(A,t)  is the one-
time demarcation cost function, and  ( , ) 0
MB C A t t ³  are the continuing costs of MB, 
including individual enforcement, border disputes, and misaligned parcels. Under MB land 
demarcation and output begin immediately at time τ = 0 and the continuing costs associated 
with MB are assumed to be increasing in the size of the region (A) and rising over time (τ) 
as these problems accumulate.  
Under a rectangular system (RS) the net value of land reflects the value of the 
network benefits of the system, such as the public goods of common addresses, survey 
coordination, as well as standardized, aligned, and fixed parcel boundaries.  These network 
and coordination benefits come, however, at the cost of a necessarily extensive system, in 
which there are upfront costs of design, survey, and controlling access until demarcation is 
completed.
17  
Individual land claimants under RS do not face demarcation costs as with MB, so 
the total present value of the land in the region governed by RS is 
(2) 
         
) ( ) (
'
0 0
( , ) ( , )
T
RS r RS r V A t e d C A t e d V
t
t t
t t t t
- - = - ∫ ∫ ,  
where  ( , ) V A t t  is the optimal value for the region at time τ;  and  ( , ) 0
RS C A t t ³  is the cost of 
the system that occurs prior to claiming and use during the period from τ=0 to τ= τ’.  
Network effects are incorporated into the land value function, which is increasing in the 
area governed by the regime A and because 
* ( , ) ( , ) V A t V A t t t >  . The RS system costs are 
increasing in A, but at a decreasing rate, revealing network economies.  These costs are also 
                                                 
17 Our MB – RS cost distinction is similar to Dixit’s (2003) distinction between local (informal) and large 
(formal-legal) trading systems, where the latter have greater setup costs like RS. 10 
 
increasing in topography.
18  Because RS requires surveying before parcel selection, the time 
horizon for generating value from the land begins at τ’ > 0.  It is efficient to implement RS 
when  
RS MB V V -  > 0 or when  







RS MB r RS r MB r V V V V e d V C e d c C e d
t
t t t
t t t t
t
t t t
- - - - = - - + + + > ∫ ∫ ∫  
This difference has four terms that illustrate the tradeoffs between a rectangular 
system and metes and bounds.  The first term comprises the network gains from RS over 
MB. The second term is the gains from MB that would be sacrificed during the period the 
RS is being implemented, in terms of output under metes and bounds and rectangular 
system setup costs. The third term is the foregone individual demarcation costs under MB 
not required under RS, and the fourth term is the avoided continued costs of MB over the 
time horizon. From (3) comparatives statics emerge:  the net value of RS will increase in 
the size of the governed land area (A), increase in the expected time horizon (T), and 
decrease in the time of RS implementation (τ).  We thus expect the Empire is more likely to 
choose a rectangular land demarcation system when: a) the larger are the tracts of land 
under its control;  b) the longer is the expected time horizon of its control; c) the more 
quickly the system can be implemented; and d) the greater the network benefits among the 
parties. 
Considering forces likely to change the model parameters can illuminate these 
predictions. For instance, more rugged topography would reduce net gains from a 
rectangular system by increasing the costs and time of implementation and perhaps even by 
reducing the losses of sub-optimal parcel shape. 
 Similarly a region with no recognized 
                                                 
18 These effects are greater than with MB because more rigid squares are required, relative to flexible parcel 
shapes under MB. 11 
 
incumbent demarcation system existed will have lower rectangular system implementation 
costs.  Third, greater political authority by the Empire and cohesion among the population 
will increase the expected time horizon of control, lower implementation times, and hence, 
make the adoption of a rectangular system more likely.  
We now modify this framework to more closely link it to land demarcation regimes 
used within the temperate regions of the British Empire.  As we discuss in detail in the next 
section, not only were RS and MB chosen but a third hybrid regime was also implemented 
as implied above.  Table 1 summarizes these three demarcation regimes: the rectangular 
systems (RS), a hybrid or mixed system (MX), and metes and bounds (MB).  The second 
regime can be generally characterized as providing some network benefits through planned 
demarcation and prior survey that are lower than RS because of the lack of parcel 
uniformity, but in certain environments had lower upfront survey costs due to less rigidity 
in  parcel size, shape and arrangement.  
[Table 1 here]   
The value generated by the third hybrid regime (MX) can be seen as a modification 
of (3). Relative to MB, the hybrid has higher network gains as indicated in the first term 
because it is planned and coordinated, but fewer than those offered by RS because of 
varying plot sizes and shapes.  The gains from MB, as indicated in the second term are 
lower relative to MX as compared to RS, because the former has more flexible shapes and 
hence possibly lower set up times. The third and fourth terms, foregone individual 
demarcation costs, and avoided continued costs under MB are generally the same as with 
RS. The major difference then between RS and MX is that the former standardizes 12 
 
information through parcel uniformity, at the expense of a more rigid structure of its 
upfront costs.    
Several predictions follow and are merely extensions of those derived above and are 
expected to be tightly connected to heterogeneity in the land and potential inhabitants.  The 
Empire is more likely to choose the hybrid demarcation system a) the smaller and more 
variable in quality and topography are the tracts of land under its control;  b) the shorter is 
the expected time horizon of its control; and c) the longer it takes for the colony-wide 
system can be implemented. 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
   To test these predictions about the choice in land demarcation institutions in the 
British Empire we employ two methods.  First, we examine the history of colonial land 
demarcation by examining the literature and the contemporary political debates.  Second, 
we assemble a data base at the colonial level which includes information on demarcation 
institutions and on exogenous land characteristics.   
A. Framework Predictions and Demarcation across the Temperate Colonies. 
  The framework predicts that time of ownership or control by the Empire and the 
lack of incumbent demarcation practices should raise the likelihood of observing systematic 
demarcation, such as the rectangular survey. These two factors did not vary across the 
temperate colonies. By the time Britain was establishing its North American, Australian, 
and New Zealand colonies in the 17
th-19
th centuries, it was the premier world power, and 
this did not change significantly until WWI. Britain was the home of the industrial 
revolution beginning in the 18
th century; it defeated the Dutch and France in North America 
between 1664 and 1763; and faced no serious competition in Australia or New Zealand. 13 
 
Spain, another potential competitor, was driven from most of its western hemisphere 
colonies between 1810 and 1825.  Accordingly, Britain had secure control over its colonial 
territories, increasing the expected time path of returns of implementing new institutional 
forms. 
  In terms of local demarcation practices, indigenous peoples tended to be sparsely 
populated without formal demarcation of the land at least that was generally adhered to by 
Britain.  The groups were militarily defeated, allowing the Britain to implement British 
land demarcation institutions across its temperate colonies (Linklater 2002, 24-40).
19 
The other factors described in the framework, however, do vary across the colonies, 
and we use this information to explain differences in observed land institutions.  Although 
colonial towns often were laid out with lots following a rectangular grid, the demarcation of 
agricultural lands did not have such uniformity.  Table 2 describes the different institutions 
found in the temperate colonies, following the classifications described above and 
organized by system.  
[Table 2 here]  
Figures 2 and 3 show examples of varying demarcation across the Empire.  The 
discussion of practices across the colonies is ordered according to the type of regime that 
prevailed in each. Among the variables identified in the framework developed above, 
historical narratives provide information on the roles of a). Control over land and the 
population so that survey could precede settlement; b). Time of settlement that indicates 
access to newer more accurate survey techniques and equipment that lower the costs of RS; 
                                                 
19 In the colonial period, only in New Zealand in the North Island were population numbers sufficiently large 
that natives had more political and military power requiring accommodation. See Hailey (1938, 713).  
Population estimates for the temperate colonies at the time of settlement are limited. Some sources include 
Borah (1976, 13-34), Pool (1977), Vamplew  (1987). 14 
 
c). Terrain that influences both the costs of survey and monitoring control over settlement, 
as well as the returns to systematic demarcation if rough terrain reduces potential 
agricultural land value; and d). Soil quality that influences agricultural land values, farm 
size, and population densities.  The network gains provided by RS increase in the number 
of parcels and farms and decline with lower intrinsic land value due to soil quality.   
[Figures 2and 3 here] 
  MB: The Southern American Colonies, the Middle Atlantic Colonies,
 New 
  South Wales,  Tasmania, Queensland, and Western Australia.  
 
These were all relatively early colonies, most established in the 17
th and early 18
th 
centuries so that settlement and demarcation took place with more primitive, costly survey 
instruments, making RS more difficult. Although there were early plans for more orderly, 
coordinated settlement and land demarcation through RS in the Georgia and South 
Carolina, these failed.
 20 There was little control over claimants in the southern American 
colonies. As colonial immigrants moved into the interior, land areas were indiscriminately 
selected, settled, and then surveyed in a haphazard manner using metes and bounds. As a 
result there was little consistency in parcel shapes, sizes, or alignment, and boundaries were 
vague. Swamps and irregular terrain also made more systematic survey difficult (Linklater 
2002, 32-40).  
  In the Middle Atlantic colonies, William Penn, who was granted the territory of 
Pennsylvania in 1681, also had envisioned an orderly land distribution with contiguous tiers 
of townships of 5,000 acres square, surveyed prior to settlement, moving west from the 
Delaware River as RS.  But this generally did not occur in Pennsylvania or elsewhere in 
                                                 
20 Marschner (1960, 22-24, 33-36), Kain and Baigent (1992, 269-76), Price (1995, 97 on free choice; see also 
7, 15-18, 87-205 for discussion of the southern colonies), Thrower (1966, 10), Johnson (1957, 22), Kinda 
(2001, 143), Mitchell (1983). 15 
 
New Jersey, New York, and Delaware where there was only loose central control over the 
distribution of land, and parcels were haphazardly defined prior to survey as MB 
(Marschner 1960, 2734, 35; Price 1995, 212).  The challenges of rough terrain and variable 
land quality for systematic demarcation in RS were noted by a surveyor in Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania: “the habitable land lyes so in patches among the mountains and 
barrens that one tract canot always (nor often) lye contiguous with another, for that reason 
alone it will be very much to your loss if every man be allowed to take what quantity he 
things fit…And this I fear will often be the case if the warrants are issued before the tracts 
are survey’d.”
21  
Limited control, rough terrain and variable soil quality also led to MB in the early 
Australia colonies of New South Wales (1770), Tasmania (1803), Queensland (a part of 
New South Wales until 1859), and Western Australia (1826).  New South Wales and 
Tasmania began as penal colonies for Britain and not initially as locations for emigration to 
new land. As a result, there was little constraint on internal migration and land claims. 
Although instructions to colonial governors called for British institutions to be 
implemented for planned centralized allocation and survey of land into small farms under 
RS, claiming and demarcation instead was much more ad hoc under metes and bounds.  
In the interior, terrain was rough and in New South Wales, semi aridity resulted in 
large parcels being claimed and a dispersed population, reducing potential network gains 
from RS (Jeans 1966, 125-7; Jeans 1967, 243-54; Kain and Baigent 1992, 307-10).  Efforts 
to implement Wakefield’s plans for systematic survey and distribution via RS in 1821, 
failed.
22 Tasmania, or Van Diemen’s Land, was administered as part of New South Wales 
                                                 
21 Quoted in Kain and Baigent (1992, 287-88), Price (1995, 207- 283). 
22 Winch (1965, 94-108), Jeans (1966, 119-23).  Similar arguments are found in Jeans (1975).  16 
 
until 1824 with little planning or control over settlement or coordinated demarcation (Kain 
and Baigent 1992, 307; Jones 1989, 41). As predicted, rugged terrain raised the costs of 
developing townships with systematic rectangular survey.
23 Most arable land was occupied 
by individuals and then surveyed under MB. The same terrain problems and lack of control 
over land claiming in Queensland led to the dominance of MB in that colony 
(Jeans,1966,122-23; Kain and Baigent,1992, 307). Although not adjacent to New South 
Wales, Western Australia faced similar problems of settlement prior to survey, coupled 
with very dry terrain and mixed soil quality that did not blend with a small, uniform land 
distribution policy.
24  
  Mixed: New England,
 Nova Scotia, Quebec, and New Zealand.  
 
  In terms of timing all, but New Zealand (largely settled in the 19
th century), were 
very early colonies dating from the 17
th century.
25 Quebec was colonized beginning in 1608 
by France and French land demarcation was incorporated by the British.  This timing 
suggests more primitive survey practices, which all things equal, would reduce the use of 
RS. These colonies also generally had rough terrain that raised survey costs. What 
distinguishes them from the previous group was greater control over land settlement and 
demarcation.  In these colonies, survey occurred first before occupation, but terrain appears 
to have limited the use of RS. The result was a mixed demarcation system that varied 
across the colonies.  
                                                 
23 Jones (1989, 75). Personal communication with Brownwyn Meikle, a post graduate student at the 
University of Tasmania who is studying early land policies, January 2010.  See also McKay (1962) for 
discussion of Tasmanian survey and land demarcation. .  
24 Jeans (1975, 3-5) discusses the general problem in Australia of limited good farm land and dry conditions 
that favored pastoral pursuits, rather than farming. For problems in Queensland and Western Australia with 
squatting and “free homesteading, see Williams (1975, 94). See Kain and Baigent (1992, 307, 309) for 
reference to unregulated distribution of land in huge parcels in West Australia (Swan River colony). 
25 New England included Massachusetts (1620, Plymouth, 1628, Massachusetts Bay Colony), Maine (1622), 
New Hampshire (1623), Rhode Island (1636), and Connecticut (1633). Nova Scotia was (1621), while New 
Zealand settlement largely occurred in the 19
th century after 1838. 17 
 
  In New England land was demarcated into (generally) square townships of 6 to 10 
miles and internally divided into town lots and agricultural plots, including common fields. 
Proprietors distributed land to the township inhabitants. Within the township, properties 
were not of equal size or uniform shape, but based on social standing, wealth, and family 
size. Settlement was communal, often organized around religious groups from an existing 
community in England (Marschner 1960, 24, 25; Egleston 1886, 21-22, 41-45; Price 1995, 
13-14, 28-29; Kinda 2001, 142).  As settlers moved into the interior, they petitioned 
colonial governments for land grants that were distributed as new “towns” or townships 
(Kain and Baigent 1992, 285-86; Egleston 1886, 15).  Lands were to be collectively to 
build a “compact state of freeholders” and were to be surveyed and marked within 12 
months of the township grant. There was limited independent squatting on land (Egleston 
1886, 15-18; Price 1995, 28-35.) 
 Township locations were not coordinated and could be 
scattered. This organized pattern of survey and demarcation tended to weaken as migration 
moved further into the more rugged New England interior (Price 1995, 34-35).  
Nova Scotia (1621) land demarcation patterns were similar to those in New England 
with local townships. In some cases townships were large, of 100,000 acres given to a 
collective group. Individual shares within the township could be up to 500 acres. The 
external township lines were surveyed prior to the grant and the township community was 
responsible for subdivision (Kinda (2001, 142), Thomson (1966, 118-120). 
Quebec was made part of the British Empire in 1763 after the treaty of Paris. The 
French crown granted land to seigneurs who subdivided their grants into individual plots of 
60-100 acres in long narrow lots that fronted the St. Lawrence River. The seigneurs then 
recruited colonists to occupy and rent their lands.  In this way, the land was surveyed and 18 
 
demarcated prior to settlement in a manner similar to townships in New England (Harris 
and Guelke 1977, 135-53; Kain and Baigent1992, 276-98, 303; Thomson 1966, 38, 76-77). 
Demarcation in New Zealand was affected by the control over settlement provided 
both by Wakefield’s philosophies implemented by the New Zealand Land Company 
organized in 1838 (Winch 1965, 111-13) and improvements in surveying with triangulation 
that appeared by the 19
th century.  Indeed, RS was the initial plan.  Six (and later 10) 
provinces were established in New Zealand and each adopted a separate, but similar land 
demarcation system: Wellington, Nelson, Taranaki, Otago, Canterbury, and Hawke’s Bay 
(Scott 1998, 51; Kain and Baigent 1992, 318, 319).
26 The New Zealand Company’s initial 
RS system worked to some degree in Canterbury, which was relatively flat, but ran afoul of 
rough terrain and other natural features that raised the costs of demarcating into square 
sections elsewhere. An alternative standardized survey system with variable parcel sizes, 
shapes, and alignment was adopted using triangulation.  Triangulation provided systematic 
location, addresses, and well defined boundaries. It was first used in Otago and spread 
throughout all of New Zealand by 1876 (Kain and Baigent 1992, 320-24). 
  RS:  Federal Public Lands, Canadian Dominion Lands, Ontario, New 
  Brunswick, South Australia, Victoria. 
   
  These regions were settled relatively later, generally in the late 18
th and early to 
mid19
th centuries; are characterized by flat terrain and fertile soil; and by effective land 
control.  These factors appear to have encouraged survey prior to settlement into RS.  There 
was clear government authority in the U.S. under the Federal Land Ordinance of 1785 
(Public Lands System Survey, PLSS), where land was surveyed into 6 by 6 mile townships 
(480 chains per side) and subdivided into 36 sections of one square mile each before to sale 
                                                 
26 They were combined into a single colony in 1876. 
 Through 1870 most agricultural settlement took place on 
the South Island (Greasley and Oxley 2009, 326). 19 
 
and settlement.
27 The PLSS was inaugurated for the comparatively flat and rich soils of the 
Midwest and gradually extended across the Great Plains.  The rectangular survey was 
adopted because of its ability to promote “…an orderly settlement of new lands,” prevent 
the scattered and uneven claiming of only the best lands “…leaving vacant and 
uncultivated, in such irregularity, small and incommodious parcells that it is thought 
scarcely worth any one’s While….,” reduce land boundary conflicts and “prevent 
innumerable frauds and enable us to save millions”, and importantly raise land values and 
revenue “…these Lands will provide a considerable resource for sinking the national debt, 
and, if rightly conducted, liten the burthens of our fellow-citizens on account of Taxes as 
well as give relief to the creditors of the United States.”
28   
  In Ontario (1763), flat, fertile land along the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River 
also was demarcated in a grid with 6-mile square townships a standard, although there was 
variation in township and subdivision size across the province. Near lakes, narrow, 
rectangular long lots also were used (Kain and Baigent 1992, 298-303; Taylor 1945, 90-92; 
Thomson 1966, 237-43).
  Similar demarcation was practiced in the south and east of the St. 
Lawrence in Quebec, called the “Eastern Townships” and the colony of New Brunswick  
(1784) (Kain and Baigent 1992, 298; Taylor 1945, 89; Thomson 1966, 99, 224-5; Schott 
1980).  The Dominion Land Survey (DLS), which began in1871, was implemented in the 
Prairie Provinces of Canada to parallel the PLSS in the U.S. with land surveyed into 6-mile 
square townships that were aligned and addressed along lines of latitude and longitude 
(Kain and Baigent 1992, 303; McKercher 1986, 21; Taylor 1975, 11; MacGregor, 1981). 
                                                 
27 Linklater (2002, 69-72). As described by Pattison (1957, 49-51), the rectangular survey used Gunter’s chain 
with 10 square chains to the acre; a mile divided into 80 chains; and a square mile in to 640 acres; White 
(1983).  
28 Ford (1910, 15) in describing a letter from Governor Sharp of Maryland to Lard Baltimore in 1754. See 
also Kain and Baigent (1992, 289-92) and Cazier (1976). 20 
 
In Victoria, Australia (separated from New South Wales in 1851) RS was used as 
the agricultural frontier moved northwest beyond Port Philip (Melbourne) in the 1850s.
 The 
main cadastral unit for surveying and mapping properties was the parish that varied in size 
between 15 and 33 square miles. Some parish borders were aligned rectilinearly toward 
magnetic north, similar to PLSS in the U.S. In the Melbourne-Colac-Geelong triangle to the 
west of Melbourne, parishes were divided into sections of 640 acres and subdivisions of 80 
and 40 acres (Kain and Baigent 1992, 311-13; Powell 1970, 51-68; 1975, 35).   
South Australia (1834) was the definitive planned colony. Colonization was 
organized after 1835 by the South Australian Land Company.  Land was surveyed into 
rectangular grids following Wakefield’s philosophy (Winch 1965, 97-110; Burroughs 1967, 
179; Oldham 1917, 4, 10, 14; Wakefield 1834, 3-19). Wakefield wanted “…to prevent ‘a 
few good judges of their own interests’ from buying up all the available profitable, waste 
lands” and avoid the “injurious” dispersion of settlement where “each settler became the 
proprietor of a small section of land; under such conditions society was impossible….
29 A 
land registry system designed by Robert Torrens to facilitate the clear assignment of land 
rights and active land markets was adopted and represented a break from use of English 
common law deeds of transfer (Kain and Baigent 1992, 313-17; Burroughs 1967, 179; 
South Australia Department of Lands 1986, 8, 38; Powell, 1972). 
The historical data are consistent with the framework in Section III. To more 
precisely examine the effects of the variables described in the framework, we now turn to 
econometric analysis of the adoption of a particular regime.  
 
 
                                                 
29 Oldham (1917, 14-15), Wakefield (1834, 87-89). Wakefield admired the U.S. federal lands policy (1834, p. 
99-103). 21 
 
B . Econometric Analysis Using Data on Land Characteristics  
  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  With the use of Geographic Information System (GIS) data, we compile a dataset of 
land characteristics at the colonial level for each area listed in Table 2.  Observations are 
centered at the initial point of British settlement within the colony and include all land area 
within a 50 mile radius.  By overlaying publicly available spatial data we calculate 
variables for terrain ruggedness, soil quality, area governed and year of settlement.  Terrain 
ruggedness is a measure of average surface slope in a region and is derived from 90m 
digital elevation models (DEMs) generated by the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 
(SRTM).  Soil quality is the average of a seven-point score where a value of 1 indicates soil 
unsuitable for agriculture and 7 indicates soil with unconstrained productivity. Source data 
soil quality comes from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ)  dataset.  Area 
governed represents the land area within the boundaries of the observation measured in 
1,000 km
2.  More complete descriptions of how the variables were constructed can be 
found in the Data Appendix.  
  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in our analysis by 
demarcation type.  On average, RS is observed over large regions with relatively flat terrain 
and above average soil quality, which seems to line up nicely with the historical analysis.  
In addition, the reported means for settlement year suggest an increasing level of order and 
uniformity in demarcation practices over time. 
[Table 3 here] 
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  Determinants of Adoption: OLS Estimates 
  To understand the relative importance of the variables in Table 3, we estimate the 
decision to adopt a systematic demarcation system by ordinary least squares (OLS) from 
the following linear regression model 
30  
(4)  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 
where yi is an ordered outcome variable representing the adopted demarcation system in 
colony i ordered by increasing uniformity.  The regressor Ti measures terrain ruggedness in 
colony i,  Li is the area governed (size of colony or region), Si is soil quality, Di is the date 
of initial settlement in years and εi is a random error term.   
  As seen in the historical analysis, accounting for political control and enforcement 
of demarcation activities appears to play a role in whether a system can be implemented.  
Areas lacking effective control will have higher costs of implementing systematic 
demarcation and tend to favor MB by default.  This presents a potential problem for 
econometric interpretation if determinants of political control are correlated with the 
determinants of adopting a particular system.  Therefore we also test the regression model 
on a restricted sample where pure MB observations are excluded.  This ensures the 
remaining observations are ones where a definitive level of control is observed. OLS 
estimates for the full and restricted samples are reported in Table 4.  Given the linear 
model, we can loosely interpret the dependent variables as response probabilities and the 
coefficients as marginal effects.
31 
 [Table 4 here] 
                                                 
30 OLS regression is chosen over a maximum likelihood approach in this analysis because of its preferable 
small sample properties. 
31 In the case of the full sample, we can interpret the coefficients as two times the marginal effects. 23 
 
  The results show general consistency with our theoretical predictions and historical 
analysis.  Though not significant in the full sample, terrain ruggedness and soil quality have 
the correct sign predicted from the theory.  Terrain ruggedness becomes significant in the 
restricted sample, perhaps as a result of reduced noise from removing uncontrolled MB 
observations, and helps to verify the important impact terrain has on surveying costs.  The 
variable for area governed is positive and significant as predicted, and supports the 
hypothesis that the gains from uniform demarcation increase with the size of the network.  
The full sample coefficient implies that an increase in 2 million square kilometers, 
approximately one standard deviation, should increase the likelihood of adopting an RS by 
8%.  The effect of area governed is slightly larger in the restricted sample and considerably 
more significant.  This possibly suggests that some larger regions in our sample where MB 
is observed may have adopted an RS system had there been adequate initial control.  Lastly, 
we find a large and significant effect for the year of initial settlement in both samples.  Our 
main interpretation of this effect is that progressive development of survey technology over 
time lowered the costs and implementation-time of systematic survey.  To get a rough idea 
of the magnitude of this effect, the results suggest that RS adoption in a frontier settlement 
would be 15% more likely over a century's time within the time-frame of our sample. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
A half century has passed since Ronald Coase taught economists the importance of 
the fundamental institutions that underlie markets.  He pointed out the link between 
property rights and transaction costs; how legal and other factors determine them; and how 
these in turn shape economic outcomes.  These insights have influenced subsequent work 
of economists working on transaction costs, property rights, economic organization, and 24 
 
development.
32  Ironically, the institutions of land – one of Coase’s original examples – 
have been neglected in the expansion of institutional economics. 
In this paper we have examined the economic history of land demarcation in the 
expansive British Empire, using the insights of Ronald Coase. We have developed an 
economic framework for examining the decision to adopt a particular system of 
demarcation of rights to land.  Using that framework we have analyzed the variation in 
institutions across the temperate British Empire, ranging from the systematic rectangular 
survey to an organized hybrid, to unsystematic metes and bounds.  This variation occurred 
despite efforts by leading British political economists and colonial politicians, such as 
Edward Gibbons Wakefield, as well as the British Colonial Office to implement a planned 
and controlled rectangular survey for the demarcation of land.  
We have found that a simple framework that outlines the costs and benefits of 
implementing the demarcation systems can explain the different institutions that are 
observed.  Once in place, these institutions persist, indicating a strong institutional path 
dependence that can influence transaction costs, the extent of land markets, and the nature 
of resource use. The agricultural land institutions that we have examined in the U.S., 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that were put into place between the 17
th and 19
th 
centuries, remain in force today.  In this regard, institutions of land are durable, much as are 
other institutions, such as language and law. 
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Appendix: Variables and Data Sources 
 
Observations:  Observations are centered at the initial point of British settlement and 
include all land area within a 50 mile radius.  For the US Public Land Survey we use the 
'Point of Beginning' located in present day East Liverpool, Ohio at the coordinates 
40°38′32.61″N 80°31′9.76″W. For the Dominion Land Survey of Canada we use the center 
of Winnipeg as the initial point.  Coordinates for initial settlements were obtained from 
http://facstaff.unca.edu/mcmcclur/GoogleMaps/Projections/GoogleCoords.html.   
 
Terrain Ruggedness:  Measures average surface slope for the region (see Libecap Lueck 
2009).  The measure is derived from 90m digital elevation models (DEMs) downloaded 
from http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org.  The DEMs are generated from NASA's Shuttle Radar 
Topography Mission (SRTM) and further processed by the International  Centre for 
Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) to fill voids in the dataset.  We exclude water bodies in our 
measure of terrain ruggedness.  This was done by removing areas in the DEM which 
overlap data from the SRTM Water Body Database (SWBD).  SWBD data was obtained 
online from http://dds.cr.usgs.gov/srtm/version2_1/SWBD. 
 
Soil Quality:  Based on a seven-point score measuring constraints on soil fertility from the 
Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) dataset downloaded at 30 arc second resolution 
from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ.  We reverse the order of the GAEZ 
ranking to reflect quality of the soil rather than constraints.  A score of 1 indicates soil 
unsuitable for agriculture.  Scores 2-6 indicate soil suitable for agriculture but with 
constrained productivity and severity of constraints decreasing with score.  A score of 7 
indicates unconstrained soil.  The final measure is an average over the area of the 
observation. 
 
Year of Settlement: Initial year of settlement was obtained from 
http://www.britishempire.co.uk/timeline/colonies.htm.  The earliest year listed for each 
colony is used for the analysis with the exception of New Zealand and Victoria, 1840 and 
1851 respectively, in which we use the year they separated from New South Whales.  Initial 
years for the PLSS and DLS are 1785 and 1871 respectively. 
  
Area Governed:  Measured as the land area of the territory in 1,000 km
2.  Current 
boundaries of Ontario and Quebec were used to determine area for Upper and Lower 
Canada respectively.  Area under the Dominion Land Survey was calculated as the 
collective area of the provinces Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta.  Area under the U.S. 
Public Land Survey System was calculated as the collective area of all U.S. states not 
included in our sample with the exceptions of Hawaii, Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
California, Alaska, Kentucky, West Virginia, Tennessee and Vermont.  Area for New 
Zealand territories were adapted from the map in Kain and Baignet (1984, 319, Figure 
8.30).  Area for all other observations use current boundaries.   32 
 
Table 1: Three Land Demarcation Regimes   
Characteristic  Rectangular 
Survey 
Mixed   Metes and Bounds 
Controlled entry  Yes  Yes  No 
Prior survey  Yes  Yes  No 
Plot shape  Rectilinear  Varies  Idiosyncratic 
Plot alignment  Yes (often N-S)  Varies  No 
Fully contiguous   Yes (within region)  Varies  No 
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Table 2: Land Demarcation Systems in the British Empire 
Jurisdiction  Demarcation System 
U.S. Federal Lands  RS 
Canadian Dominion Lands  RS 
South Australia  RS 
Ontario, Canada  RS 
Victoria, Australia  RS 
New Zealand: Otago  MX 
New Zealand: Nelson  MX 
New Zealand: Wellington  MX 
New Zealand: Canterbury  MX 
New Zealand: Hawkes Bay  MX 
New Zealand: Taranaki  MX 
Connecticut  MX 
Rhode Island  MX 
Massachusetts  MX 
Maine  MX 
New Hampshire  MX 
Nova Scotia  MX 
New Brunswick  MX 
Quebec  MX 
Georgia  MB  
South Carolina  MB  
North Carolina  MB  
Virginia*  MB  
Maryland  MB  
Delaware  MB  
Pennsylvania  MB  
New Jersey  MB  
New York  MB  
New South Wales  MB  
Tasmania  MB  
Queensland  MB  
West Australia  MB  
Sources: See text. * includes what is now Kentucky and West Virginia. 
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MB (13)  1.61  3.01  45.7  1707 
(1.39)  (0.74)  (78.7)  (75) 
MX (14)  2.36  3.34  13.7  1746 
(1.33)  (.97)  (35.4)  (99) 
RS (5)  1.09  4.32  283.2  1827 
(0.65)  (1.63)  (373.9)  (37) 
Total (32)  1.85  3.39  68.8  1743 














2  F Stat 
MB = 0, MX = 1, RS = 2  -0.117  0.141  .00078*  0.0038*  0.32  5.5 
(32 Obs)  [0.086]  [0.137]  [.00044]  [0.0011] 
 
MX = 0, RS = 1  -0.171**  0.031  .00086**  0.0028**  0.65  33.6 
(19 Obs)  [0.069]  [0.080]  [.00020]  [0.0007] 
Notes: OLS coefficient estimates are reported.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in brackets. 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Source: Adapted from Price (1995, 8). Price’s Federal rectangular grid corresponds to our RS; Townships to  
our Mixed Demarcation; and Irregular to our MB classification.  
 
                                                 
33 The figure is modified from the figure provided in 
http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:British_Empire_evolution.gif   
 
Figure 2: Early U.S. Demarcation Systems 
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Sources: New England: McManis (1975, 56); Ontario: Schott (1936, reprinted, 1981, 84); South Australia: 
Kain (1992, 315);  New South Wales: 
http://parishmaps.lands.nsw.gov.au/mrsid/show_map.pl?client=pmap&image=PMapEast02/10075001.sid&m
apval1=CARDINGTON&mapval2=560&maptype=PL; Victoria: http://www.honeycombe-








Mixed Demarcation, New England Townships  RS Demarcation, Ontario, Canada 
RS Demarcation, South Australia  MB Demarcation, New South Wales, 
Mixed Demarcation, New Zealand 
 
RS Demarcation Victoria, 
Australia 
Figure 3: Land demarcation practices in the British colonies 
 